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This study examines the relationship between time discounting, other sources of time preference, and
intertemporal choices about smoking. Using a survey fielded for our analysis, we elicit rates of time
discount from choices in financial and health domains. We also examine the relationship between
other determinants of time preference and smoking status. We find very high rates of time discount
in the financial realm for a horizon of one year, irrespective of smoking status. In the health domain,
the implied rates of time discount decline with the length of the time delay (hyperbolic discounting)
and the sign of the payoff (the "sign effect"). We use a series of questions about the willingness to
undergo a colonoscopy to elicit short- and long-run rates of discount in a quasi-hyperbolic discounting
framework, finding no evidence that short-run and long-run rates of discount differ by smoking status.
Using more general measures of time preference, i.e., impulsivity and length of financial planning
horizon, smokers are more impatient. However, neither of these measures is significantly correlated
with the measures of time discounting. Our results indicate that subjective rates of time discount revealed
through committed choice scenarios are not related to differences in smoking behavior. Rather, a combination
of more general measures of time preference and self-control, i.e., impulsivity and financial planning,
are more closely related to the smoking decision.
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The recent economics literature on anomalies of intertemporal choice and self-
control has been focused on alternatives to the standard assumption of exponential time-
discounting. Building on Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968), research by Laibson 
(1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) sparked a large new literature that explores the 
consequences of (quasi)-hyperbolic discounting in many areas, including savings behavior, 
labor, environmental, and health economics, and corporate finance.  Models of hyperbolic 
discounting have often augmented or replaced the insights derived from standard models, 
rationalized puzzling behaviors, and generated new testable predictions. Importantly, 
certain welfare consequences of government policy have been shown to depend critically 
on whether consumers are (quasi-) hyperbolic rather than standard, exponential discounters 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 2005). For example, if agents are hyperbolic discounters, the 
welfare benefits of an increased tax on cigarettes may be greatly magnified because 
problems of self-control induce net costs of smoking that are internal to the smoker 
(Gruber and Köszegi 2001, 2004; Sloan, Ostermann, Picone et al. 2004).   
This literature on hyperbolic discounting has grown rapidly, in part, because 
experimental evidence of hyperbolic discounting is voluminous. When choosing now to 
commit to present or future intertemporal tradeoffs, individuals commonly display 
declining (hyperbolic) rates of time discount. As Strotz (1956) first demonstrated, declining 
rates of time discount revealed by such committed choices imply time-inconsistency and 
problems of self-control when choices are uncommitted. There are, however, other 
potential sources of time preference and problems of self-control not reflected in time 
discount functions and thus the committed choices of individual decision makers. In 
  1models of dual selves (or cognitive processes) and of temptation costs, for example, 
present-biased time preference, tastes for commitment, and apparent time-inconsistency 
may emerge for reasons unrelated to the time discount function.
1  Recent empirical work is 
also consistent with the idea that substantially improving models of intertemporal choice 
may require more than the proper calibration of the discount function (Bernheim, Skinner, 
and Weinberg 2001; Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy, 2003; Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, and Tyler 
2004). 
In this study, using data collected for our research, we examine the relationship 
between time discounting, other sources of time preference, and intertemporal choices 
about smoking. The decision to smoke represents an interremporal tradeoff with substantial 
implications for individual and social welfare, and thus provides a natural context in which 
to study these issues. We elicit rates of time discount from choices in both financial and 
health domains. We also examine the relationship between other determinants of time 
preference and smoking status. Specifically, we employ a proxy for respondents’ degree of 
self-control using measures of impulsivity in individual behaviors. We investigate whether 
these and other measures of self-control differ by smoking status and to what extent these 
measures are correlated with subjective rates of time discount.  
Using standard questions regarding committed intertemporal choices in the 
financial and health domains, we find patterns consistent with previous research on 
subjective rates of time discount. Responses to now standard hypothetical, choice scenarios 
reveal very high rates of time discount in the financial realm for a horizon of one year, 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Laibson (2001) and Bernheim and Rangel (2004) on cue-triggered consumption, Thaler and Shefrin 
(1988) ,Benhabib and Bisin (2005), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005),  Fudenberg and Levine 
(forthcoming), and Ozdenoren, Salant, and Silverman (2006), on dual self/system models, and Gul and 
Pesendorfer (2001) on models of costly self-control. 
  2irrespective of smoking status. Consistent with previous research, we find evidence that 
these implied rates of time discount decline with the length of the time delay, (hyperbolic 
discounting), and the sign of the payoff (the “sign effect”). We find the effect of size of 
stakes on choices for gains but not for losses (the “magnitude effect”). Further, we use a 
series of questions about the willingness to undergo a colonoscopy, a procedure 
recommended for all persons in the age group of respondents to our survey, irrespective of 
smoking status, to elicit short- and long-run rates of discount in a quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting framework. We find no evidence that short-run and long-run rates of discount 
differ by smoking status.   
While several measures of time discounting in our data replicate patterns seen 
consistently in the literature, there is no correlation between these measures and smoking 
status.  Our findings thus indicate that variation in time discounting is not a driving force 
behind differences in smoking behavior. However, we find that measures of impulsivity 
and length of financial planning horizon are related to smoking decisions. Those who, 
according to a composite measure reflecting a tendency for emotional rather than 
thoughtful responses to external circumstances, are more impulsive are also significantly 
more likely to have or continue to smoke.
2 Similarly, current smokers tend to have shorter 
financial planning horizons, even conditional on their longevity expectations. Neither of 
these measures of planning or self-control is significantly correlated with the standard 
measures of time discounting. Although we find that subjective rates of time discount 
revealed through committed choice scenarios are unrelated to differences in smoking 
                                                 
2  This finding is qualitatively consistent with results in experimental psychology which draw on (typically 
small) samples of younger people. See, for example, Mitchell (1999) with 20 college-aged smokers and 
references contained therein.  
 
  3behavior, a combination of more general measures of self-control, impulsivity and financial 
planning, is related to the smoking decision.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our data source and 
shows how the smokers in these data exhibit many of the characteristics and behaviors 
noted previously in the literature. Section III presents our methods and results regarding 
subjective rates of time discount in the financial and health domains, and their relationship 
to smoking decisions. This section ends with analysis of alternative sources of time 
preference--impulsivity and length of planning horizon.  Section IV concludes. 
II. Data  
Our analysis relies on data from the Survey on Smoking (SOS). The SOS was 
conducted by the research firm Battelle from October 2004-January 2005 at three sites 
where Battelle offices are located, Durham, North Carolina, St. Louis, Missouri, and 
Seattle, Washington.  There were three interviews: a screener to determine age eligibility 
and smoking status administered by telephone; a second longer interview also conducted by 
telephone; and an in-person computer-assisted interview. All information used in this paper 
came from the screener and the longer telephone interview. Given the study questions, the 
SOS is more comprehensive in asking questions about time preference, self control, and 
impulsivity than are previous surveys on smoking.  
The SOS sample consisted of adults aged 50-70 at the interview date, who were 
current, former, or never smokers. At this age, never-smokers are very unlikely to start 
(Sloan, Smith, and Taylor 2003). The most relevant decision in this group is therefore 
whether to quit smoking. The decision to quit smoking is both common and consequential 
  4for health, even at older ages.
3  To the extent that traits such as time discounting rates or 
degrees of impulsivity are permanent, our analysis also sheds light on the decision to start 
smoking.  
Since much of the survey dealt with smoking status, current smokers were 
oversampled. The analysis sample from the first survey consisted of 663 individuals, 252 
current, 257 former, and 154 never smokers. The response rate for the longer telephone 
interview was approximately 80%.  The analysis sample from the follow-up survey 
consisted of 431 individuals, of whom 149 were current, 165 former, and 117 were never 
smokers. The follow-up survey included questions on time discounting in the health 
domain, risk preference, and the value of avoiding smoking-related illness.   
Descriptive statistics for the sample of persons who responded to both SOS surveys 
and the sample of those who only responded to the first survey are shown in Table 1. 
Higher proportions of current and former smokers responded to both surveys and a 
correspondingly lower proportion of never smokers responded to both. On average, persons 
who responded to both surveys had lower educational attainment. Persons who responded 
to both surveys also had lower self-reported health on average.   
Stylized facts about smokers reported by others (see e.g., Brigham 1998, Sloan, 
Smith, and Taylor 2003; Sloan, Ostermann, Picone et al. 2004, Slovic 2001) are also found 
in the SOS data (not shown in Table 1), although respondents to the SOS are much older 
than respondents to the vast majority of previous surveys on smoking. The mean age at 
which individuals begin smoking is 16.7 years. Current smokers consume between 11 and 
20 cigarettes a day. Of current smokers, 84.9% said that they had tried quitting in the past. 
                                                 
3 At least 30% of smokers attempt to quit annually (Fiore et al. 1990; Hughes et al. 1992); and even those who 
quit smoking at age 65 will gain, on average, 2-3 years in life expectancy (Taylor, Hasselblad,  Hensley et al. 
2002).  
  5The mean age at which they first tried to quit was 37.3 years. On average, they had quit for 
more than a month on 1.71 occasions. For persons who were former smokers at the 
interview date, the number of quit attempts for longer than a month was 1.98. Among 
current smokers, 76.2% said that they would like to quit smoking. Important reasons for 
relapses among current smokers who had quit were stress (41.2%), habit or physical 
addiction (13.7%), and desire to be social (13.1%). Major factors that led to quitting were 
health shocks (44.4%),
4 precaution against future health shocks (13.6%), and for family 
reasons (11.3%).  
These facts indicate that (1) a substantial number of persons quit, (2) many people 
try to quit and relapse, (3) a minority of people who have ever smoked have never tried to 
quit, and (4) judging from the reasons people give for quitting and relapsing, more is at 
work than simple physical addiction. Only 13.7 percent of current smokers report relapsing 
because they are physically addicted. Taken together, these patterns of behavior are 
consistent with problems of self-control and a taste for commitment. 
Indeed, in the SOS, the vast majority of smokers use commitment devices to curb 
their smoking, implying that they are aware of a self control problem. The SOS asked, “To 
limit my smoking, I buy packs rather than cartons. Do you: disagree strongly, disagree, 
disagree somewhat, agree somewhat, agree, and agree strongly?”  Twenty-seven percent of 
current smokers said that they at least somewhat agreed with the statement that they buy 
packs for this reason. The SOS also contained an open-ended question about other 
commitment devices smokers. “In no more than a few sentences, could you describe other 
strategies you use to limit the amount you smoke?” Eighty-one percent used some type of 
                                                 
4 Sloan, Smith, and Taylor (2003), using data from the Health and Retirement Study, found that health shocks 
were the major determinant of quitting among mature smokers.  
  6self-control device.
5  The responses to the open-ended question indicate that almost everyone 
claims to use a commitment device of some sort. 
The literature on hyperbolic discounting has also been motivated in part by an 
observation that people resort to various commitment devices that would not be used by 
time-consistent expected utility maximizers. A stylized fact used by Gruber and Köszegi 
(2001) to motivate their analysis of smoking decisions is that smokers are unable to carry out 
their own plans for levels of future cigarette consumption. Gruber and Köszegi state that 
“unrealized intentions to quit at some future date are a common feature of stated smoker 
preferences” (p.1279). They provide evidence that, among high school seniors, 56% claimed 
that they would quit in five years, but only 31% quit in that time.  
Evidence from much older respondents to the SOS is consistent with this finding.  
The SOS question was “Roughly how many cigarettes do you expect to smoke per day two 
years from now?” Those smokers who said that would be smoking zero cigarettes were 
classified as self-assessed quitters. The self-assessed probability of quitting was compared 
with actual quit rates computed from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a national 
longitudinal survey of persons aged over 50.
6  The mean subjective probability from SOS of 
having quit in two years was 0.41. In the HRS, by comparison, the corresponding, objective 
                                                 
5 Commitment devices listed other than buying packs rather than cartons:  (1) keep busy, keep hands busy, work 
out in the yard, do a lot of reading and crossword puzzles, washing dishes and cleaning, talk to someone on the 
telephone; (2) stop smoking in the house, go outside, no smoking at work, put myself in places where smoking 
is not allowed; (3) keep diary to see when last smoked, limit myself to one cigarette each half an hour, leave 
cigarette burning after two puffs, smoke first half of cigarette, do not smoke early in the morning; (4) chew gum 
or hard candy, eating, I brush my teeth when I got a big craving for a cigarette, drink water; (5) put cigarettes 
out of reach when I am at home, try not to have any in the house, don’t take them with me; (6) patch, medicine; 
(7) avoid other smokers.  
6 See Juster and Suzman (1995) for details. 
  7two-year quit rate was 0.16.
7  Like youths, mature smokers thus appear to be overly 
optimistic about quitting. This is further evidence that people have difficulty implementing 
their plans about intertemporal consumption, at least in the context of smoking.  
III. Methods and Results  
III. A. Time Discounting in the Financial Domain   
Much of the evidence discussed in the previous subsection is qualitatively 
consistent with the problems of self-control that would emerge from hyperbolic time 
discounting. In this section we begin our direct examination of time discounting with the 
responses to intertemporal tradeoffs in the financial domain. The first SOS interview asked 
four questions about winning or losing money now versus a year from now. The questions 
were worded as “Would you rather win (lose) $x now or $y a year from now?”  Values of x 
were set at $20 or $1,000, and values of y were $30 and alternatively $1,500. This allowed 
us to gauge whether the stakes involved affect the choices. These questions reveal 
preferences under commitment, and thus reflect the standard measure of subjective time 
discounting.  
To evaluate whether rates of time discounting in the financial domain differ by 
smoking status and by the amounts at stake, we run regressions of the following form:   
di  =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +φ* wi +γ*li +π* vi + εi                     (1),  
where di is an indicator variable for the less patient choice and equals 1 if the person elects 
to receive the money now and or pay the money later and equals 0 otherwise; csi and fsi are 
indicator variables for current and former smokers respectively (never smokers are the 
omitted group), wi is an indicator variable for the choice of winning $20 now or $30 a year 
                                                 
7 We also estimated probits which included age, marital status, gender, educational attainment, race, and self-
rated health status as regressors to correct for differences in sample characteristics between the SOS and HRS. 
The results were almost identical to those reported.  
  8later, li is an indicator variable for the choice of losing $30 a year later or $20 now, and vi is 
an indicator for the choice of  losing $1,500 a year later or $1,000 now (choice of winning 
$1,000 now versus $1,500 a year later is the omitted group). 
We find that 51% of respondents would rather win $1,000 now than $1,500 in a 
year (Table 2, col. 1). When the scale of the reward is decreased to $20 now versus $30 a 
year from now, 67% of individuals prefer to have the money immediately.  This is 
consistent with previous findings on the “magnitude effect;” individuals are more present-
oriented when the stakes are small (see e.g., Thaler 1981, Loewenstein 1987, Benzion, 
Rapoport, and Yagil 1989). 
However, 31% of individuals would prefer to lose $30 a year from now rather than 
$20 now. When faced with the choice of losing $1,500 a year from now versus $1,000 now, 
38% would prefer to delay their loss. Although these results for losses are inconsistent with 
the magnitude effect, when compared with those concerning financial gains these findings 
are consistent with previous research showing the “sign effect” (see e.g., Thaler 1981; 
Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil 1989); people generally prefer to postpone losses, but reveal 
smaller rates of time discount when the tradeoff is between losses rather than gains.
 
Importantly, the coefficients on smoking status indicate no difference in financial tradeoffs 
by smoking status.  
We repeat the analysis separately for each of the smoking groups, and find that the 
parameters are very similar among the groups (Table 2, cols. 2-4).  We conclude that (1) 
there is evidence for both the sign and magnitude effects found previously in the literature 
but,  (2) time discounting as measured by these financial tradeoff questions does not differ 
by smoking status.  
  9II. B. Time Discounting in the Health Domain   
In this section, we investigate the relationship between time discounting and the 
decision to smoke using questions about the health domain.We do this in the health domain 
as it is plausibly the appropriate domain to examine time discounting for health-related 
intertemporal choices such as smoking.
8 
III. B.1. Healthy Days    
To measure time discounting in the health domain we use responses to the 
following questions from the second (the in-person) SOS interview. Responses were 
elicited to the following statement: “20 extra days in perfect health this year would be just 
as good as ____ extra days in perfect health x year(s) from now” where x is alternatively 1, 
5, 10, and 20 and n is the number of extra health days. Assuming exponential time 
discounting, where  ρ  is the rate of time preference, if the individual is indifferent between 
n extra healthy days at time x, and 20 extra healthy days this year, then e
-[ρt]*U(20) = e
-
[ρ(t+x)]*U(n), which implies that  ρ  = [ln(U(n))- ln(U(20))]/x. 
We assume that utility is linear with respect to these extra days of health, pool all 
responses to all questions and run regressions of the following form:    
ρ i  =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +φ* t5i + γ *t10i + π* t20i + εi          (2),  
where t5i, t10i ,and  t20i  are indicator variables for the relevant comparison years and 
number of extra days a year from now is the omitted group.    
When the time horizon involves a comparison of equivalence of 20 healthy days 
this year versus healthy days a year from now, for never smokers,  ρ  is estimated to be 0.5 
                                                 
8 The questions do not, however, refer to smoking versus health tradeoffs per se.  Such tradeoffs would more 
likely depend directly on smoking behavior and thus capture less well an underlying tendency toward 
(im)patience in the health domain. 
  10(Table 3, col. 1). The implied discount rate is extremely large, which is similar to our 
finding for financial discount rates based on a horizon of one year (see Table 1). However, 
when the comparison is extra healthy days in five, 10, and 20 years from now versus 20 
extra healthy days this year, the estimate of  ρ  decreases to 0.14, 0.08, and 0.05, 
respectively.  Thus the implied rate of time discount declines sharply as the tradeoff is 
pushed futher into the future. We find no differences by smoking status. In columns 3-5, we 
stratify by smoking status and find results that are qualitatively similar to the pooled 
findings.
9 
In sum, our analysis reveals that health discount rates fall dramatically with the 
length of the time horizon, a pattern that is consistent with hyperbolic discounting.   
However, this finding is, as argued by Read (2001, 2003), observationally equivalent to 
subadditive discounting.  In computing a discount rate, with additive discounting, the 
discount rate one would calculate over a delay, the time at which the choice is made the 
time at the outcome is realized, is independent over the number of intervals in the delay 
over which the discount rate is calculated. An interval is the difference in time between two 
outcomes for which there is an intertemporal tradeoff.  With subadditive discounting, the 
total discount rate over the delay becomes larger as the number of intervals is increased.
10  
Our finding that time discounting decreases with increases in the delay, which is 
common in the previous literature, is based on questions that confound delay and the 
interval. In our analysis, the delay is the time difference between this year and some distant 
year, e.g., five, 10, or 20 years whereas by the nature of the questions, this coincides with 
the interval since the tradeoff is between healthy days this year and the distant year. To 
                                                 
9 The exception is that the point estimates indicate that former smokers have lower short-term rates of time 
discount than do either current or never smokers. These differences are not, however, statistically significant. 
10 For details, see Read (2003).  
  11disentangle these two effects, it is sufficient to keep constant the interval between the two 
choices while varying period between the present and when the later outcome is to be 
realized. The questions used in this part of the analysis follow conventions of the literature 
and are subject to Read’s critique. Hence, as described in the following section, the SOS 
asked another set of questions to measure time discounting that are not subject to this 
critique. 
III. B.2. Months of Life Extention from Colonoscopy     
Quasi-hyperbolic time discounting has been proposed as a potential explanation 
for continued smoking (Gruber and Köszegi 2001). In this subsection, we seek direct 
evidence of short- and long-run discount factors and examine whether or not these differ by 
smoking status.   
              We again use a survey-based approach for estimating the short- and long-run 
discount factors. The second interview of the SOS contained a series question about the 
longevity benefit needed at different points in time for the respondent to be willing to 
undergo a colonoscopy. Colonoscopy is a procedure to screen and prevent colon cancer and 
requires uncomfortable preparations. Although unpleasant and time consuming, the 
procedure is highly accurate in detecting polyps or tumors in the colon and is recommended 
for persons in the SOS age cohort, irrespective of smoking status (Singh, Turner, Xue et al. 
2006). The procedure involves a substantial cost in time and unpleasantness but offers a 
potentially large benefit in terms of increased longevity. These characteristics make 
questions about a colonoscopy a good instrument for eliciting rates of time discounting 
from nonsmokers and smokers alike in the health domain. After presenting a description of 
the procedure and the required preparation, the SOS asked respondents to rate on a scale 
  12from 0 to 10 the degree of discomfort associated with the procedure, based on the 
description they just heard. Since the vast majority of persons are likely to have had 
insurance for this procedure, time and discomfort involved are plausibly the major costs to 
individuals of having a colonoscopy. There were no statistically significant differences in 
the mean rating of discomfort between current and never and former and never smokers.  
We elicit discount rates using responses to intertemporal choices about willingness 
to undergo colonoscopy. The SOS asked three questions about the payoff in terms of added 
life expectancy required for the individual to choose to get a colonoscopy. Before asking 
the questions, respondents were instructed in what having a colonoscopy entails.
11 
Assuming a finite lifespan consisting of periods indexed by t. For each individual i 
at time t, the SOS elicited the individual’s subjective life expectancy (Nit). The first 
colonoscopy question sought to determine the number of months of added life expectancy 
(X1i) needed to induce the person to get a colonoscopy now.
12 For individual i, let ci be the 
                                                 
11This is the text explaining to respondents what a colonoscopy entails. This explanation was provided before 
the sequence of questions about willingness to undergo this procedure were asked.   
“People differ in how they think about the value of preventive care. The following items are about a preventive 
test that many people receive after the age of 50. The procedure is called a colonoscopy.  
o  The colon is the large intestine. This procedure is the best method for screening patients for colon cancer. 
By preventing colon cancer, life can often be extended as some of the disability and discomfort from the 
disease can often be avoided. Before the doctor begins the procedure, the patient is given anesthesia to 
reduce discomfort from the procedure. Because the patient may be sleepy afterwards, it is necessary for 
someone to drive the patient to the clinic where the procedure is done. 
o  A colonoscope, a long flexible tubular instrument, is inserted into the rectum. The other end of the scope 
has video visualization enabling the physician to directly inspect the lining of the colon. Other instruments, 
such as biopsy forceps, can be passed through the colonoscope to perform certain surgical procedures.  
Before the procedure: 
o  Colonoscopy can be performed in either hospitals or outpatient surgical centers. It is very important to 
follow the instructions carefully because the colon must be completely clean for a successful test. 
o  The patient is asked not to eat or drink anything for at least 8 hours before the colonoscopy. A clear liquid 
diet is required the day before the exam. 
The patient also takes a liquid bowel stimulant the day before the procedure to cleanse out the colon.”  
 
12 Question 1 was phrased as: “Suppose you were told that by having the colonoscopy, you could extend your 
life expectancy from (N to N+ X1). Would you have the colonoscopy now?” The starting value for X1 was 
randomly drawn from 6 months to 5 years; iterations continued until the person chose to have a colonoscopy. 
  13instantaneous disutility of having a colonoscopy, and Vi(Nit  – t) be the utility of the 
anticipated remaining years of life at t. If the annual rate of time discount is  ρ γ +  in the 
first year, and  ρ  in the subsequent years, then if the individual is indifferent between 
having a colonoscopy and receiving X1i additional years of life, we get an indifference 
equation of the following form:  
Vi(Nit – t) = ci + Vi(Nit – t) +   α
t) - (N - - it e i i ρ γ
i X1i , 
where the additional months of life required to achieve this indifference (X1i) arrive at  the 
end of the expected life time and are therefore discounted by  . The parameter α
t) - (N - - it e
i i ρ γ
i is 
the individual-specific, time invariant value of an extra month of life. This indifference 
equation implies that  
           ci = e α
t) - (N - - it i i ρ γ
i X1i                                (3). 
A second question asked the extra months of life expectancy needed for the person 
to be willing to have a colonoscopy a year from now (X2i) keeping the longevity 
expectations the same. Responses to this question imply a second indifference equation of 
the form:  
Vi(Nit – t) = e c i i ρ γ - -
i + Vi(Nit – t) +  α
t) - (N - - it e i i ρ γ
i X2i .  
                                                                                                                                                 
7.3 percent of responses were left-censored at 6 months and 0.3 percent of responses were right-censored at 5 
years. We assume values at these limits in cases in which persons gave left- or right-censored values.  
The second question was phrased as: “Suppose you were told that by having the colonoscopy a year from 
now, you could extend your life expectancy from (N to N+ X2) years, would you be willing to have the 
procedure a year from now?”  The SOS followed the same rules for picking starting values and determining 
values for the censored observations as in Question 1. 7.7 percent of values were left- and 0.7 percent of values 
were right-censored.  
The third question was phrased as: “Now suppose that your life expectancy was (N+1), that is, your life 
expectancy was extended by a year from the life expectancy you gave me earlier, and suppose you were told 
that by having a colonoscopy a year from now, you could extend your life expectancy from (N+1 to N+1+X3) 
years, would you be willing to have the procedure a year from now?” The SOS followed the same rules for 
picking starting values and determining values for the censored observations as in Question 1. 11.0 percent of 
values were left- and 0.8 percent of values were right-censored. 
  14The cost of a colonoscopy is unchanged but is discounted since the colonoscopy is delayed 
by a year.  The second indifference equation implies  
i ρ - e ci =  α
t) - (N - it e i ρ
i X2i                               (4). 
Equations (3) and (4) yield  
t) - (N - it e i ρ αi X2i    = e α
1) t - (N - - it + i i ρ γ
i X1i , 
or  (ln(X1i /X2i) = i i ρ γ + . 
The SOS included a third question that delayed the benefits from the colonoscopy. 
This question added a year to the individual’s subjective life expectancy (Nit+12), and then 
asked what the added months of life expectancy would have to be for the person to get a 
colonoscopy a year from now (X3i).  Responses to this question imply an indifference 
equation of the following form:  
Vi(Nit – t) + e α
t) - (N - - it i i ρ γ
i*12 =  c i i ρ γ - - e i + Vi(Nit – t) +  α
t) - (N - - it e i i ρ γ
i*12  + e α
1) t - (N - - it + i i ρ γ
i X3i,, 
where the arrival of the extra 12 months of longevity is postponed to the end of the 
person’s life and the extra months are made available to the individual even if the person 
refuses to have a colonoscopy. This indifference equation implies   
i ρ - e ci =  α
1) t - (N - it e
+ i ρ
i X3i                                       (5). 
Equations (4) and (5) yield  
1) t - (N - it e
+ i ρ αi X3i    = e α
t) - (N - it i ρ
i X2i, 
or  ln(X3i /X2i) =  i ρ . Hence, ln(X1i /X3i)=  i γ . 
We use the recovered values of  ρ  and  γ to determine whether or not there is 
hyperbolic discounting and whether or not there are differences in discounting by smoking 
status. 
  15 As a preliminary step, we run regressions with the dependent variable being the 
months needed to be willing to get a colonoscopy of the form:  
 X i  =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +φ* Q1i +γ*Q3i +εi    (6),   
where the dependent variable Xi is the response to questions 1, 2, or 3, and Q1i (Q3i) is an 
indicator variable for question 1 (3); the omitted category is question 2.  
Never smokers require an additional 13.25 months to their life expectancy on 
average to undergo a colonoscopy now (Table 4, col. 1).
13 To have a colonoscopy a year 
from now, such persons require 1.02 months less additional life expectancy. When 
individuals are queried about getting a colonoscopy a year from now assuming their life 
expectancy is also increased by a year, then such persons require 1.36 months less than if 
they were to have the colonoscopy now.  
Our mean estimate of the extra months of longevity people require to have a 
colonscopy exceed estimates of the objective longevity return to the procedure (Lin, 
Kozarek, Schembre et al. 2006). For person of mean age in the SOS sample, the mean life 
extension from having a colonoscopy is 7.6 months.
14 This gap should be viewed in light of 
the fact that the most recent published results appeared two years after the SOS was 
conducted. Also, the SOS elicited the asking price, which given that many persons in this 
age group do not get colonoscopies, should be higher on average than the objective amount 
                                                 
13 The SOS allowed responses to the colonoscopy questions to vary from 6 months to 59 months. As a result, 
7.3 percent of the observations to question 1 were left-censored and 0.3 percent were right-censored. We used 
the mid-point between 0 and 6 months for the left-censored observations and an equal number of extra months 
for the right-censored observations. For question 2, 7.7 percent of observations were left-censored, and none 
were right-censored. For question 3, 11.0 percent of observations were left- and 0.8 percent were right-
censored. To gauge the sensitivity of our findings to assumptions made about the value used for right-censoring, 
we substituted a value of 75 months for the value of 62.25 months used in the main calculations. There was 
virtually no change in the results.   
14 According to Lin, Kozarek, Schembre et al. (2006), mean life extension from having a colonoscopy was 0.85 
years for 50-54 year olds and 0.17 for 75-79 year olds. Using linear interpolation to compute the decline in 
expected life extension for each additional year of life yields 0.63 years for a person aged 60. Converting 0.63 
years into months yields the estimate reported in the text.  
  16of life extension. In view of these considerations, the stated asking prices obtained from 
SOS respondents are overall quite reasonable. Our finding that fewer months are required 
to induce a colonoscopy if performed a year from now is consistent with discounting, either 
exponential or hyperbolic. However, compared to responses from the second question, 
delaying benefits by a year in the third question should have led to more rather than fewer 
months being required to have a colonoscopy. Although the difference is 0.36 of a month, 
the difference is in the wrong direction. We speculate that this disprepancy may reflect 
non-linear utility for longevity (or decreasing marginal utility of a lifeyear). Importantly, 
there are no statistically significant differences by smoking status just as for the analysis of 
the financial tradeoff and extra healthy days questions reported above.  
To obtain estimates of  ρ γ +  and  ρ , we estimate two regressions together of the 
following form:  
ln(X1i /X2i) =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +φ* ri +εi                (7a)  
and  
ln(X3i /X2i) =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +φ* ri +εi                (7b),  
where X1i , X2i, and X3i are responses to the first, second, and third colonoscopy questions, 
respectively, and ri is an indicator with the value zero if the dependent variable is from (7a) 
and the value one if the dependent various is from (7b).    
The estimate of the sum of the parameters  ρ γ +  for never smokers, the omitted 
group, is negative but statistically insignificant as is the estimate of  ρ  (Table 5, col. 1), 
implying that the discount factors are not statistically different from one. There are no 
statistically significant differences by smoking status. In column 2, which is based on the 
sample of current smokers, the estimate of  ρ γ +  is 0.073 and the estimate of  ρ  is -0.077, 
  17implying that  γ for current smokers is about 0.14. Both parameter estimates are not 
statistically significant from zero, as in column 1. In column 3, for former smokers,  ρ γ +  is 
-0.030 and the estimate of  ρ  is -0.044, implying that  γ for current smokers is slightly 
positive. However, these estimates also are not statistically significant. Finally, in column 
4, for never smokers,  ρ γ +  is -0.083 and the estimate of  ρ  is 0.074, implying that  γ for 
current smokers is negative, which is opposite of the pattern of current smokers. Since 
these too are insignificant, we do not attach great importance to these differences in 
parameter estimates. The reason why our point estimates of  ρ γ +  are negative in column 1 
is that respondents required fewer months for a colonoscopy when the benefits were 
delayed by a year in the third question. Importantly, a pattern consistent with the responses 
to questions discussed above is that there are no statistically significant differences by 
smoking status.  
To our knowledge, the SOS is the first attempt to elicit short- and long-run rates of 
time preference this way. Overall, the estimated additional years of life required to be 
willing to obtain a colonoscopy are within a plausible range.  Fewer than 10 percent of 
responses were either left- or right censored. However, the questions became increasing 
mentally taxing (especially the third question). While the approach is promising, we make  
two suggestions for future research. First, respondents should be given a few practice 
questions (perhaps in the financial domain) to learn how to respond to the time discounting 
concepts in the context of a structured survey. Second, the survey should account for the 
possibility that the marginal utility of a life year may decline as longevity is extended.   
III. C. Alternative Sources of Time Preferences 
III. C. 1. Planning  
  18Thus far, we have assessed differences in time discounting. We now investigate a 
more general framework which allows other psychological motives to enter in 
intertemporal decisions. We begin with an examination of the financial planning horizon. 
The length of the planning horizon should capture longevity expectations, but also other 
factors such as planning ability or more general problems of self control (Ameriks, Caplan, 
and Leahy 2003). The SOS telephone interview asked respondents “In planning your 
savings and spending, which of the following time periods is most important to you and 
your household?” Choices available to respondents were: “the next few months, the next 
year, the next few years, the next 5-10 years, longer than 10 years.”     
    We estimated an equation of the following form:     
         zi  =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +φ*pi + γ *Ai  + εi           (8),  
where zi is the length in years of the person’s planning horizon, pi is the individual’s 
subjective probablity of surviving to age 75, and Ai is the person’s age.  Together, pi and Ai 
measure the person’s expected longevity, which would influence the person’s planning 
horizon. We convert responses to questions for discrete planning horizon categories to a 
continuous measure in years as follows: < year = 0.5 year; next year = 1 year; next few 
years = 2.5 years; next 5-10 years = 7.5 years; and longer than 10 years = 20 years. Since 
the final category was open-ended, in an alternative specification, we replace 20 with 10 
years to examine robustness of our findings to our assumption about the mean value of the 
response category.  
Without controlling for other factors, current smokers have shorter financial 
planning horizons, irrespective of the value assigned to the open-ended category (Table 6, 
cols. 1 and 3).  Using a 20-year value (10-year value) for the open-ended category, current 
  19smokers on average have a financial planning horizon which is 1.7 years (1.2 years) less 
than for never smokers. Planning horizons of former smokers do not differ from those of 
never smokers.  The observed difference between current and never smokers is reduced to 
1.2 years (0.9) when we control for age and the subjective probability of living to age 75.
15  
Thus, some but not all of the observed difference between current and never smokers in 
financial horizon is due to the individuals’ subjective beliefs about longevity.  
In sum, current smokers have a shorter financial planning horizon than never 
smokers. This suggests that smokers are more present-oriented in ways not captured by the 
above analysis of time discounting. The questions regarding financial planning horizons 
seem to reflect determinants of time preference that are independent of both time 
discounting and longevity expectations. Hence, in the next section, we explore differences 
by smoking status with a still more general measure of time preference.       
III. C. 2. Impulsivity          
In this subsection, we measure a still more general source of time preference and 
relate it to the smoking decision. We use impulsivity as a measure of an individual’s ability 
to set goals and to exercise self-control. The telephone interview of SOS recovered 
impulsivity using a series of 14 statements, such as “I make hasty decisions,” I do not 
control my temper,” and “I act on impulse.”
16  Respondents were asked whether they 
“disagree strongly,” “disagree,” “neither disagree nor agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” 
with each of these statements. The actual wording of the questions varied so that “strongly 
agree” sometimes implied high self-control and low impulsivity and sometimes implied the 
                                                 
15 We also use ordered probit analysis, which does not require an assumption about the value of the open-ended 
category. The results are qualitatively the same as those reported. 
16 We thank George Loewenstein for providing us with these questions.   
  20opposite. In our analysis, we convert the answers to a consistent form in which “strongly 
agree” always implies high impulsivity and low self-control.  
We create an index of impulsivity and self-control by converting the responses to a 
five-point scale with “disagree strongly” =1 and “agree strongly” =5 and summing the 
scores for individual items.
17 The index varies from 14 to 70 with higher values implying 
greater impulsivity. In Fig. 1, which shows the distribution of scores by smoking status, 
proportionally more current smokers than others have scores of 40 and above.   
To examine differences in the index by smoking status, we estimate an equation 
regression of the form  
bi  =  α + θ* csi  + µ* fsi  +Φ΄* Hi  + εi      ( 9 ) ,    
where bi is the index defined above an indicator variable equal to 1 if the person elects to 
receive or pay the money now and is 0 otherwise, Hi is a vector of demographic 
characteristics.   
On average, never smokers have an index of 33.9 (Table 7, col. 1). Current smokers 
on average have an index which is 2.1 points higher. For former smokers, the index is 2.2 
points higher. These means are quite tightly estimated and, thus, both current and former 
smokers are significantly more impulsive than never smokers.  
Controlling for years of education, gender, race, and age, the index for never 
smokers rises to 34.7. The difference for current smokers is 1.5 and former smokers is 1.7.  
Education makes people less impulsive; males tend to be more impulsive on average.  As 
with financial planning, smokers tend to be more impulsive which is a more general 
                                                 
17 Specific items are listed in Appendix Table 1. This table also presents difference in means and in distributions 
by smoking status for each of the items in our impulsivity index.   
  21measure of time preference. This result is robust to controls for important demographic 
characteristics.              
Our results thus indicate that there is not much difference in time discounting by 
smoking status, but there are differences in measures of time preference related to financial 
planning and other measures of self-control as reflected in our index of impulsivity. Within 
domains, measures of time discounting are positively correlated, but not across financial 
and health domains (Table 8). Financial planning horizon is positively correlated with 
financial discounting. There is a negative correlation between financial planning horizon 
and the impulsivity index, suggesting that financial planning reflects both time discounting 
and other elements of time preference.   
IV. Conclusion    
Based on data from a survey fielded for our research, our key finding is that there 
are no significant differences in time discounting by smoking status. While our results 
replicate various patterns in time discounting that have been used to explain time 
inconsistency in intertemporal decision making--in particular, declining rates of time 
discounting as the time period is extended, the average time discount function of smokers is 
not different from that of non-smokers. Differences in smoking behavior late in life, 
therefore seem likely to reflect factors other than time discounting.
18  
Subtler patterns reported previously in the literature on time discounting also 
appeared in our data: the measured rates of time discount reflected a dependence on 
                                                 
18 With the exception of Becker and Mulligan (1997) most work treats time discounting as a primitive of an 
economic model. We follow that convention here. Reynolds (2006) uses a sample of 15 smokers and 15 non-
smokers who were on average in their early 30s and finds that the smokers discount delay at a higher rate. 
Bickel, Odum, and Madden (1999), using a sample of 23 current, 21 former smokers, and 22 never smokers 
which on average had mean ages in the early 30s found that current smokers had higher discount rates than did 
former or never smokers. There were no differences in discounting between former and never smokers. 
Although this result conflicts with ours, they did find that current smokers were relatively impulsive, a 
qualitatively similar result to ours.    
  22magnitude, sign and domain that the previous literature has also noted. Our respondents 
demonstrated considerable over-optimism about quitting rates and substantial reliance on 
commitment devices. In this sense, much of our evidence is consistent with hyperbolic 
discounting. Nevertheless, we find little evidence that differences in rates of time discount 
are importantly related to differences in smoking decisions. Our findings are in contrast to 
those of a seminal study (Fuchs 1982), which examined associations between financial 
rates of time preference and smoking. Our results suggest that it is inappropriate to proxy 
time preference with measures of smoking behavior.  
However, time discounting, as revealed by the intertemporal tradeoffs made by 
committed consumers, is just one potential determinant of time preference revealed by 
uncommitted choices. The intertemporal tradeoffs represented by actual smoking decisions, 
the tastes for commitment revealed by smokers and their over-optimism about quitting all 
may emerge through many channels. Even though variations in time discounting do not 
appear to be a primary force behind differences in smoking decisions, measures that reflect 
self-control and other psychological processes are better correlated with the smoking 
decision. Both a measure of impulsivity and of financial time horizon (net of longevity 
expectations) are related to smoking decisions. Those who are more impulsive and plan less 
for the future are more likely to smoke. In this way, our findings suggest that problems of 
self control in intertemporal choices may not be well captured by time-varying rates of time 
discount. 
Our findings thus provide further motivation for models that “open the black box” 
of time preference to model and investigate the behavioral implications of alternative 
psychological processes. Rather than identifying smoking simply with higher rates of time 
  23discount or more present-biased time discounting, our results indicate that smoking may be 
a marker for greater problems of self-control that emerge through other channels. 
Specifically, the relative strength of the relationship between measures of impulsivity, 
planning horizons and smoking decisions points toward a growing literature that models 
ideas such as costly-self control, dual selves and decision processes, and cue-theories of 
consumption. Our findings indicate that, in the smoking domain, the predictions of such 
modeling may prove a useful complement to research on alternatives to the standard 
exponential discount function. 
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   Smoking status             
      Current smoker  0.380 0.486 0.346* 0.476 0.444  0.498
      Former smoker  0.388 0.488 0.383 0.487 0.397  0.490
      Never smoker  0.232 0.423 0.271** 0.445 0.159  0.367
   Demographic characteristics 
      Age  59.620 5.823 59.343 5.736 60.138  5.959
      Non-Hispanic white  0.863 0.344 0.868 0.339 0.853  0.355
      African American  0.107 0.309 0.102 0.303 0.116  0.320
      Hispanic  0.003 0.055 0.002 0.048 0.004  0.067
      Other races   0.018 0.134 0.028 0.165 0.026  0.159
      Male  0.357 0.479 0.378 0.485 0.319  0.467
      Married  0.587 0.493 0.577 0.495 0.607  0.489
      Years of education  14.334 2.583 14.640** 2.585 13.753  2.482
   Self-reported health   
       Excellent  0.172 0.378 0.193* 0.395 0.134  0.341
       Very good  0.299 0.458 0.329* 0.471 0.241  0.429
       Good  0.287 0.453 0.274 0.446 0.310  0.464
       Fair  0.149 0.357 0.135 0.342 0.177  0.382
       Poor  0.090 0.287 0.070 0.255 0.129  0.336
    Impulsivity index  35.570 5.436 35.379 5.365 35.933  5.564
    Financial tradeoff variables 
      Win$1k now v.  
      $1.5k in year   0.637 0.481 0.617 0.487 0.674  0.470
      Win $20 now v.          
     $30 in year   0.800 0.401 0.771** 0.421 0.854  0.354
      Lose $1.5k in year  
      v. $1k now  0.507 0.500 0.502 0.501 0.516  0.501
      Lose $30 in year v. $20  
      now  0.452 0.498 0.457 0.499 0.441  0.498
    Planning horizon I   6.798
 
6.733 7.071 6.744 6.269 6.697
    Planning horizon II  5.025 3.614 5.231* 3.583 4.626 3.648
Number of observations  663 431 232 
*: the difference in means between the two sub-samples is significant at 5% level; **: the difference in 
means between the two sub-samples is significant at 1% level.  
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   Healthy days tradeoff              
      Extra healthy days 1   
      year from now equal to  
      20 healthy days now  68.264 111.800  
      Extra healthy days 5  
      years from now equal  to  
      20 healthy days now.   83.770 118.375  
      Extra healthy days 10  
      years from now equal to  
      20 healthy days now.   99.567 128.937  
      Extra healthy days 20  
      years from now equal to  
      20 healthy days now.   110.325 141.129  
   Having a colonoscopy        
       Extra months of life  
      needed to undergo  
      colonoscopy now  13.517 12.282  
       Extra months of life  
       needed to undergo  
       colonoscopy in year   12.512 10.329  
       Extra months of life  
       needed to undergo  
       colonoscopy a year now  
       if life expectancy is  
       extended by 1 year  now  12.265 10.316  








  29Table 2.  Financial Tradeoffs: Choices of Payment Now Versus a Year from Now 
 Sample 
Dependent variable: choice of 
payoff now = 1 versus payoff a 







0.163** 0.161**  0.178**  0.143**  Win $20 now v. $30 in year 
(0.018) (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.036) 
-0.130** -0.115** -0.131**  -0.150**  Lose $1,500 in year v. $1,000 
now (0.022)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.042) 
-0.185** -0.194** -0.177**  -0.184**  Lose $30 in year v. $20 now 
(0.023) (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.043) 
0.044       Current smoker 
(0.037)      
0.016       Former smoker 
(0.036)      
0.002       Age 
(0.002)      
0.506** 0.657**  0.625**  0.623**  Constant 
(0.142) (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.039) 
R
2 0.077  0.076  0.079  0.070 
N  2,582     973  1,005     604 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Omitted groups are winning $1,000 now v. $1,500 a year from now and never smokers. 
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Table 3.  Healthy Days Tradeoff: Number of Extra Healthy Days in the Future 









-0.357** -0.414** -0.292** -0.378**  This year v. 5 years from 
now  (0.044) (0.082)  (0.065)  (0.085) 
-0.416** -0.465** -0.360** -0.435**  This year v. 10 years from 
now (0.047)  (0.086)  (0.072)  (0.091) 
-0.454** -0.501** -0.397** -0.475**  This year v. 20 years from 
now (0.049)  (0.089)  (0.074)  (0.095) 
-0.007       Current smoker 
(0.044)      
-0.026       Former smoker 
(0.041)      
0.004       Age 
 (0.003)       
0.500** 0.535**  0.432**  0.515**  Constant 
(0.058) (0.092)  (0.077)  (0.098) 
R
2 0.104  0.113  0.089  0.117 
N  1,547     524     593     430 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Omitted groups are this year v. 1 year from now and never smokers. 
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-1.020* -1.774*  -0.976  -0.217  Get colonoscopy a year from 
now 
  (0.507) (0.847) (0.835)  (0.969) 
-1.358* -1.238  -1.747  -0.979  Get colonoscopy a year from 
now with one more year of life 
expectancy  (0.575) (1.008) (0.949)  (1.048) 
0.778       Current smoker 
 (1.631)       
-0.559       Former smoker 
 (1.312)       
13.245** 14.232** 12.784**  12.870**  Constant 
(1.129) (1.314) (0.997)  (1.228) 
R
2 
  0.005 0.003 0.006  0.001 
N     905     299     348     258 
Omitted groups: get colonoscopy now and never smoker.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%.  
  32Table 5. Discount Rates in First Year and Subsequent Years by Smoking Status  
 Sample 
Dependant variable: first year 







-0.021 -0.077 -0.044  0.074  Discount rate: subsequent 
years  (0.034) (0.056) (0.055)  (0.065) 
0.085       Current smoker 
  (0.068)      
-0.002       Former smoker 
 (0.064)       
-0.039 0.073 -0.030  -0.083  Constant 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.045)  (0.059) 
R
2  0.006 0.005 0.002  0.005 
N     562     185     217     160 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 6. Financial Planning Horizon by Smoking Status 
 
  Planning Horizon I  Planning Horizon II 
  ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 ) 
-1.711* -1.195 -1.172**  -0.902*  Current 
smoker  (0.706)  (0. 717)  (0.369)  (0. 376) 
-0.970 -0.567 -0.533  -0.311  Former 
smoker (0.696)  (0.710)  (0.362)  (0.366) 
 3.658**   1.846**  Subjective 
probability of 
living to 75 
 (0.889)   (0.507) 
 0.057   0.017  Age 
 (0.046)   (0.024) 
7.808** 1.274 5.666**  3.061*  Constant 
(0.558) (2.813) (0.282)  (1.524) 
N      643      638     643     638 
R
2 0.009  0.034  0.016  0.037 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%.  
Planning horizon I: 0.5 yr, 1 yr, 2.5 yr, 7.5 yr, 20 yr. 
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Table 7.  Impulsivity Index 
  ( 1 )  ( 2 ) 
2.121** 1.475**  Current smoker 
(0.524) (0.549) 
2.211** 1.688**  Former smoker 
(0.492) (0.491) 
 -0.313**  Years of education 
 (0.083) 
 0.156  Black 
 (0.635) 
 0.310  Hispanic 
 (2.230) 
 -1.389  Other races 
 (1.248) 
 1.058*  Male 
 (0.445) 
 0.064  Age 
  (0.035) 




  0.029 0.061 
N 649  645 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 8. Correlations among Financial Planning Horizon and Discounting Variables 
 Win $1k Now
v. Win $1.5k 
in  Year  
      Lose $1.5k in 
Year v.  Lose 
$1k Now 
Healthy Days 

















0.35             Lose $1.5k in year v.  
lose $1k now  (0.00)               
0.06            
             
               
               
              
               
              
               
              
              
               
               
               
0.10 Healthy days  trade (1 
year)  (0.26) (0.06)
0.05 0.05 0.57 Healthy days trade (10 
years)  (0.30) (0.34) (0.00)
0.05 0.05 0.47 0.93 Healthy days trade (20 
years)  (0.32) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00)
0.06 0.03 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 Discount rate: first year 
(0.33) (0.61) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10)
0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.05 -0.03 0.46 Discount rate: 
subsequent years  (0.89) (0.24) (0.04) (0.46) (0.64) (0.00)
-0.17  -0.12  -0.08  -0.06  -0.08        -0.06  -0.03    Financial Planning 
Horizon I  (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.27) (0.13) (0.34) (0.58)
0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.16 Impulsivity index 
(0.99) (0.69) (0.04) (0.94) (0.87) (0.35) (0.72) (0.00)
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Appendix Table 1. Differences in Personal Attributes by Smoking Status 
 
Chi Square Tests for Differences in 












I rarely make hasty decisions          10.82*                14.70  2.727  2.798  2.675 
I am able to get organized#  42.32**                  8.66  3.635  3.389  3.409 
I do not fly off the handle#  18.97**  34.13**   2.165*     2.320**  1.908 
There are so many little jobs that need 
to be done, but I never just ignore 
them. # 
40.03**         
   
        
5.24 2.976** 2.695 2.558
I control my temper  56.73**  65.38**    2.024**    2.113**  1.779 
I do not things on impulse that I later 
regret# 21.18**  13.86**  2.396  2.473*   2.240
I do control my angry feelings          10.60*  15.67**  2.124  2.172  2.071 
I do worry about things that might go 
wrong  30.32**               5.94  2.851  2.859  2.838 
I do consider consequences before I 
take action  29.29**  41.99**     2.373**     2.441**  2.110 
I am a worrier#  21.24**                1.50  3.132  3.129  3.170 
I do plan for the future  29.32**  24.59**     2.292**  2.172  2.032 
I never do things on the spur of the 
moment  78.55** 27.83** 2.892 2.969 3.084
I do finish what I start  16.30**  23.58**  2.137  2.312  2.916 
I do not act “on impulse” #  41.93**  23.94**    2.580**    2.545*  2.312 
scale: 1: disagree strongly, 2: disagree, 3: neither disagree nor agree, 4: agree, 5: agree strongly;  
1  t-test comparing means for current v.. never smokers 
2  t-test comparing means for former  v.. never smokers 
*significant at 5% level, **: significant at 1% level. 
#: Questions format reversed to make the higher values on the scale more impulsive.  
 